Adults' causal representations integrate information about predictive relations and the possibility of effective intervention; if one event reliably predicts another, adults can represent the possibility that acting to bring about the first event might generate the second. Here we show that although toddlers (mean age: 24 months) readily learn predictive relationships between physically connected events, they do not spontaneously initiate one event to try to generate the second (although older children, mean age: 47 months, do;
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Adults' causal representations integrate information about predictive relations and the possibility of effective intervention; if one event reliably predicts another, adults can represent the possibility that acting to bring about the first event might generate the second. Here we show that although toddlers (mean age: 24 months) readily learn predictive relationships between physically connected events, they do not spontaneously initiate one event to try to generate the second (although older children, mean age: 47 months, do; Experiments 1 and 2). Toddlers succeed only when the events are initiated by a dispositional agent (Experiment 3), when the events involve direct contact between objects (Experiment 4), or when the events are described using causal language (Experiment 5). This suggests that causal language may help children extend their initial causal representations beyond agent-initiated and direct contact events.
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. . . suppose that an individual ape . . . for the first time observes the wind blowing a tree such that the fruit falls to the ground. . . we believe that most primatologists would be astounded to see the ape, just on the bases of having observed the wind make fruit fall . . . create the same movement of the limb . . . the problem is that the wind is completely independent of the observing individual and so causal analysis would have to proceed without references to the organism's own behavior (Tomasello & Call, 1997; italics theirs)
Tomasello and Call's thought experiment suggests that the ability to recognize predictive relations among events may not entail the ability to recognize that such relations potentially support intervention. Recently, researchers have expressed a similar intuition across a variety of fields. Philosophers have suggested that only a cognitively sophisticated being would recognize ''that the very same relationship that he exploits in intervening also can be present both when other agents intervene and in nature even when no other agents are involved" (Woodward, 2007) . Similarly, psychologists have suggested that causal knowledge requires understanding causal relations as non-egocentric, stable relations among diverse events, not merely relations ''that involve rewards or punishments (as in classical or operant conditioning), not just object movements and collisions (as in the Michottean effects), and not just events that immediately result from (one's own) actions (as in operant conditioning or trial-and-error learning)" (Gopnik et al., 2004) . The implication is that human beings may be unique among animals in having a single representation (''causal knowledge") that encodes what
